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Abstract
With the developments in technology, rms can gather information about con-
sumerspurchase history which can be use to price discrimination accordingly. This
type of price discrimination is designed in economic literature as Behaviour-Based
Price Discrimination (BBPD) or dynamic pricing. This work is motivated by a
recent report of the UK regulator for the communication markets (Ofcom (2010)),
that raises concerns about the competitive and welfare e¤ects of retention strategies.
The aim of this paper is to analyze the e¤ects of BBPD where rms apply retention
strategies under a switching costs approach considering asymmetry on the switching
costs of consumers (consumers have di¤erent switching costs) and the existence of
a dominant rm.
1 Introduction
With the developments in technologies, rms are able to gather information about con-
sumerspast purchase history. This information can be used to charge di¤erent price to
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di¤erent customers according to their consumer decisions. This type of price discrimina-
tion is designed as Behaviour-Based Price Discrimination (BBPD) or dynamic pricing.
The economics literature o¤ers important insights on the economic and welfare e¤ects
of BBPD. As underlined by Chen (2005), these pricing practices are employed as an
equilibrium strategy of oligopoly rms either in markets where rms o¤er an ex-ante dif-
ferentiated product (Fudenberg and Tirole (2000), Esteves (2009), Esteves (2010), Esteves
(2014a), Esteves (2014b), Esteves and Reggiani (2014)) or in markets where rms com-
pete with an ex-ante homogenous good but there is ex-post product di¤erentiation due to
consumer switching costs1 (Chen (1997), Taylor (2003)). In both economic approaches,
BBPD tends to lower industry prots, but may or may not increase consumer welfare.
This work follows the assumption that customers have to incur a switching cost if they
decide to change supplier in the second period as presented in Chen (1997). Paying
customers to switch2 is a pricing strategy that we can nd in many competitive markets
as communication markets and banking services. For example, it is usual that telecom-
munications rm o¤ers a lower price to all customers who switch supplier or a bank that
lower the interest rate for customers from competitors bank. Social networks such as
Facebook and Twitter base their business models on future revenues generated from a
large base of user and developers that wont switch to another social network due to real
or articial switching costs. Thus, the more users of a communication service such
as Skype or Facebook, the more valuable the service is to each user and the higher the
switching cost to switch to another communication service bringing all users or friends. A
classical example is Microsoft O¢ ce that is believed to have a perceived switching cost of
over $1000 thus buyers are paying hundreds of dollars for Microsoft O¢ ce even when free
alternatives exists. In the case of Microsoft O¢ ce almost all di¤erent forms of switching
costs occur. What would be the alternative? Would this be compatible with everyone
1Switching costs are costs that consumers must incur if they decide to change supplier. There are
three types of switching costs: transaction costs, learning costs and articial or contractual costs.
(Klemperer (1987))
2Chen (1997).
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else that are using Microsoft O¢ ce? Can I transfer my templates? Would I learn fast
enough to work in the same pace? Would I miss any functions or features? Each value
provider faces a trade-o¤ between investing in adoption by charging a low price or give
away something for free to attract new value recipients or on the other hand charging a
higher price reecting the value of what is being o¤ered. Lock-in is seldom absolute but
when lock-ins is created by dominant companies and there are too high barriers to market
entry, it may result in antitrust action. And if rms can retain its customers?
With the exception of Esteves (2014) the literature on BBPD has not looked at the
possibility of rms responding to the competitorspoaching o¤ers as an attempt to avoid
the switching of their loyal customers. A report by the United Kingdom regulator for
the communication markets (Ofcom, (2010)) makes a reminder to the practice of rms
implementing retention strategies as a way to discourage customers to change the current
supplier by o¤ering them a special discount. Under a Losing Provider Led (LPL)3 process,
for the consumersswitching process to be completed, customers have to validate a code
that has to be requested from the existing rm. In the United Kingdom, customers who
want to switch their mobile telephone service must contact their existing provider and
request a Porting Authorization Code (PAC) which they then put through to their new
provider in order to complete the switching process. So, this code request provides rms
with the information that the consumers are willing to switch and allows rms to o¤er
advantageous deals to those customers with the objective of retaining them. Since save
activity can potentially make more di¢ cult the switching processes, it is important to
understand the economic and welfare e¤ects of this business practice.
Esteves (2014) investigates the impact of retention discounts when product di¤erenti-
ated rms engage in BBPD. Amorim (2012) revisits the same question in a homogeneous
3An alternative to the LPL process is the Gaining Provider Led (GPL) process. Under the GPL
process, customers only need to agree to a deal with their new provider who then contacts the customers
existing provider to complete the switching. In contrast with the LPL process, under the GPL process the
switching process is easier but the risks of mis-selling are higher because customers have less information
about the implications of the switching process.
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product market with switching costs. In both approaches BBPD with retention strategies
boost consumer surplus and social welfare at the decrease of industry prots.
The main objective of this work is to extend the model presented in Amorim (2012)
considering di¤erent switching costs among consumers. When the switching is done, there
are some transaction costs or learning costs or some psychological costs of switching. Each
rm has its own conditions to the switching process. Suppose that there are two di¤erent
rms that o¤er the same good. One rm can charge a higher price when one customer
wants change supplier. Or customers do not want to learn how to use the product of the
other rm, even if the products are similar. Or just because, for no clearly identiable
economic reasons, customers prefer one rm (brand-loyalty).
This asymmetry in the market is analysed in the paper of Sha¤er and Zhang (2000)
where it is consider an asymmetric demand measured by consumers loyalty to each rm
brand. In this study the results suggest that price discrimination leads to lower prices to
all consumers, even for existing customers (to retain them).
In this work is also assumed that there is a rm with a dominant position4 in the mar-
ket. This assumption is quite relevant due the competition issues and antitrust policies.
Consumers with high switching costs are unlikely to switch and rms charge to them a
higher price in order to exploit their locked-in customers. Thus, market share gain from
the initial purchase decisions are an important determinant of future prots (Klemperer,
1995). Moreover, the existence of a dominant rm can lead to an exclusionary e¤ect from
its rival rm. Chen (2008) analysed the e¤ects of dynamic pricing when one rm has a
stronger market position than its competitor, and with this assumption BBPD benets
consumers if the weaker rm do not exit the market. Esteves (2014) infers that rms only
have incentives to apply retention strategies if their customer base is higher than 33%.
This work is organized as follows. In Section 2 is presented the model and then at
Section 3 and 4 the benchmark cases, the uniform pricing and no retention strategies,
respectively. Section 5 is consider the model with retention strategies and Section 6 the
4A dominant rm is one which accounts for a signicant share of a given market and has a signicantly
larger market share than its next largest rival.
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optimal pricing strategies.
2 Model
In the market there are two rms, A and B, that produces a non-durable homogenous
good produced at a same and constant marginal cost, c. Without loss of generality it is
assumed that c = 0. Each consumer wants to buy one unit of the product, either from
rm A or rm B and have an identical reservation value, v.
At the beginning, consumers are indi¤erent between two rms. The product is ho-
mogeneous and consumers choose the rm with lowest price. Market is divided into an
unequal size. Firm A get a portion of  consumers, with  2 1
2
; 1

. and rm B gets the
remain demand, (1  ).
The introduction of retention strategies is motivated by the Ofcom report (Ofcom
(2010)) that analyses the economic e¤ects of saving activity in the UK telecommunication
markets. When rms are able to identify their potential switchers, then they are able to
implement retention strategies in order to discourage the switching process. Retention
strategy is a new form of pricing strategy that rms use in order to not lose their market
share.
The game is divided in two stages. In the rst stage, rms are able to price discriminate
among customers and set two di¤erent prices, one for old customers, po;Ri , and another
for rivals customers, pr;Ri , for i = A;B. After observing the set of prices of each rm,
consumers can continue to buy to the same rm (customers with high switching costs) or
change supplier (with lower switching costs). Following the Ofcom report and the LPL
process, all consumers who want to change supplier must contact their existing provider
in order to complete the switching process, giving information about their willingness to
switch provider. Given this information, in the second stage, rms are able to implemented
retention strategy, giving a discount, di, i = A;B, for all customers who show an intention
to switch. If a customer decides to switch from his current provider he has to incur a
switching cost s, uniformly distributed on [0; i]. Here it is consider that customers that
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buy from rmA and from rmB have di¤erent costs of switching, such that sA  U [0; A]
and sB  U [0; B], with A 6= B.
It is identied two kind of consumers: the passive and the active consumers. Passive
consumers do not show any intention to switch and thus do not receive a discount. In
this category is included all the consumers with high switching costs. Active consumers
express an intention to switch and receive a discount by rm. However, within this group
of consumers there are some that conclude the switching process (switchers, with lower
switching costs) and some that are retain by rm through the discount (saved/retain
customers, for which the discount is not su¢ ciently high to make the switching).
3 Uniform Pricing Benchmark
In this section we present the case when price discrimination is not feasible, either because
it is prohibited or rms cannot segment their customers.
Then, consider that rms cannot price discriminate between customers and set an
uniform price for all consumers pui , i = A;B. All customers who want to change supplier
must incur a switching cost, i:From the initial purchase decisions, there are three possible
cases: rm A charges a higher price than rm B, the price of the two rms is the same
and, rm A charges a lower price than its rivals. Firms compete a la Bertrand, deciding
simultaneously the prices. Since  > 1
2
, rm A has the weakly higher Bertrand price and
only customers from rm A will switch (those that pay a higher price at the beginning).
Given esA the level of switching cost such that the consumer is indi¤erent between buy
again from rm A and change for rm B,
v   puA = v   puB   esA
and esA = puA   puB: (1)
There are a part of consumers from rm A that change supplier while consumers from
6
rm B does not change. Thus, the demand of rm A is
quA = 
Z A
esA
1
A
dA =

A
(A   puA + puB) :
And the demand of rm B is
quB = 
Z esA
0
1
A
ds+ (1  )
Z B
0
1
B
ds =

A
(puA   puB) + (1  )
Each rm wants to maximize their prots. Then,
max
puA
puA


A
(A   puA + puB)

and
max
puB
puB


A
(puA   puB) + (1  )

Solving the rst-order conditions for the maximization problem of each rm and solving
for puA and p
u
B, it is obtained the Nash equilibrium prices and corresponding prots.
Proposition 1 When rms cannot price discriminate between their existing customers
and rivals customers, the uniform Nash equilibria prices and prots are given by:
puA =
(+1)
3
A p
u
B =
(2 )
3
A
uA =
(+1)2
9
A 
u
B =
(2 )2
9
A
for all  > 1
2
.
Without price discrimination, rms prices depend on the market share: a rms
second-period price is an increasing function of its previous market share. A rm with a
higher market share will set a higher price. Because only customers of rm A will change
supplier, prices of each rm depend only on As switching costs - rm As baseline market
share.
Prots and prices at the uniform pricing benchmark are decreasing in rm As market
share. The intuition is the following. For rm B is indi¤erent to charge a higher price for
its customers in order to exploit them or charge a lower price to capture some of rm As
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customers. The lower is (1   ), less consumers rm B has to exploit and lower is the
price charged from rm B. Given that, lower will be the price of rm A:
Moreover, prots and prices are increasing in switching costs of consumers (in this
case, the switching costs of consumers from rm A). Higher is the switching costs for
consumers from rm A, more di¢ cult is for rm B capture these customers and then
both rms compete less aggressively.
4 No Retention Strategies Benchmark
In this section it is consider the case where rms can price discriminate among its cus-
tomers but retention strategies are not feasible. This model is similar to the static analysis
presented in Sha¤er and Zhang (2000).
In rm As turf the indi¤erent consumer between buying again from A or switching
to rm is located at sA such that
v   poA = v   prB   sA
where,
sA = p
o
A   prB: (2)
The number of consumers who switch to rm B, qBA are those with lower switching
costs. qBA is given by
qBA = 
Z sA
0
1
A
ds
qBA =

A
(poA   prB):
And, the number of consumers who buy again from rm A have the highest switching
costs. qAA, is
qAA = 
Z A
sA
1
A
ds
qAA =

A
(A   poA + prB) :
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Similarly, the intuition is the same when we look at the rm Bs turf. The number of
consumers that change suppliers are
qAB =
(1  )
B
(poB   prA)
and, the consumers that continue to buy from rm B are
qBB =
(1  )
B
(B   poB + prA) :
Given the results above, the demand of each rm, Di, i = A;B is
DA =

A
(A   poA + prB) +
(1  )
B
(poB   prA)
DB =
(1  )
B
(B   poB + prA) +

A
(poA   prB)
Each rm wants to maximize its prots with each type of consumers. Thus, at the
rm As turf:In the rm As turf, each rm wants to maximize their return with each type
of consumers. Thus the maximization problem, for rm A, is
max
poA
poA
A
(A   poA + prB)
and, for rm B
max
prB
prB
A
(poA   prB) :
And in the rm Bs turf, each rm wants to
max
prA
(1  )prA
A
(poB   prA)
and, for rm B
max
poB
(1  )poB
A
(B   poB + prA) :
Solving the model, it is obtained the following results.
Proposition 2 When rms cannot implement retention strategies, the Nash equilibria
prices and prots are given by:
poA =
2
3
A p
o
B =
2
3
B
prA =
1
3
B p
r
B =
1
3
A
A =
4
9
A +
(1 )
9
B B =
4(1 )
9
B +

9
A
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5 Retention Strategies
In this section we analyse the possibility of retention strategies. Following Chen (1997)
and introducing an asymmetric demand given by the di¤erences in customersswitching
costs, the objective is to analyse the impact of retention strategies on welfare, prots and
consumer surplus.
As usual we solve the game by backward induction.
5.1 Second stage
In the second stage, rms can implement a retention strategy by o¤ering to all potential
switchers a discount, di, i = A;B.
In rmAs turf the indi¤erent consumer between buying again fromA at price po;RA  dA
or switching to rm B at price pr;RB + s

A is located at s

A such that
po;RA   dA = pr;RB + sA
where,
sA = p
o;R
A   dA   pr;RB : (3)
At sA consumers are indi¤erent between acting as passive and active consumers and
dA = 0. Thus,
sA = p
o;R
A   pr;RB : (4)
Given rm As market share, , the number of consumers who bought from rm A
and switch to rm B, qRBA, is given by
qRBA = 
Z sA
0
1
A
ds
qRBA =

A
(po;RA   dA   pr;RB ):
The number of consumers who are saved and accept the discount dA, qsAA, is given by
qsAA = 
Z sA
sA
1
A
ds
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qsAA =

A
dA:
And, the number of consumers who buy again from rm A and do not receive the
discount (passive consumers), qRAA, is
qRAA = 
Z A
sA
1
A
ds
qRAA =

A

A   po;RA + pr;RB

:
In the second stage, rm A wants to maximize the prot obtained with saved con-
sumers. Thus, rm A solves the following problem:
max
dA

po;RA   dA
 
A
dA
Solving the rst order condition, yields
dA =
po;RA
2
The second-order condition is satised for this result. The optimal discount for rm
A is given by dA =
po;RA
2
:
Following the same analysis for rm B, is straightforward to see that we can get a
similar result. Thus, the optimal discount for rm i is given by
di =
po;Ri
2
for i = A;B.
5.2 First stage
In the rst stage rms can price discriminate between their existing customers and rivals
customers setting two di¤erent prices for each group of consumers, po;Ri and p
r;R
i , i = A;B.
After observing prices, consumers choose to stay or switch depending on their switching
costs.
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In rm As turf, each rm wants to maximize their return with each type of consumers.
Thus the maximization problem, for rm A, is
max
po;RA
po;RA
A
(A   po;RA + pr;RB ) +

A
(po;RA   dA)dA
and, for rm B
max
pr;RB
pr;RB
A

po;RA   dA   pr;RB

:
For the second-stage equilibrium result, dA =
po;RA
2
the rst-order conditions yields,
po;RA =
2
3

A + p
r;R
B

pr;RB =
po;RA
4
where,
po;RA =
4
5
A (5)
and,
pr;RB =
1
5
A (6)
Looking now for rm Bs turf, the maximization problem for each rm as in the rm
As turf, each rm wants to maximize their return with each type of consumers. Thus
the maximization problem, for rm A, is
max
pr;RA
(1  )pr;RA
B

po;RB   dB   prA

and, for rm B
max
po;RB
(1  )po;RB
B
(B   po;RB + pr;RA ) +
(1  )
B
(po;RB   dB)dB
Solving the rst-order conditions and with dB =
po;RB
2
;
pr;RA =
1
5
B (7)
and,
po;RB =
4
5
B (8)
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Proposition 3 With retention strategies and asymmetric demand, the Nash equilibria
prices and prots are given by:
po;RA =
4
5
A p
o;R
B =
4
5
B
pr;RA =
1
5
B p
r;R
B =
1
5
A
dA =
2
5
A d

B =
2
5
B
and,
RA =
12
25
A +
(1 )
25
B 
R
B =
12(1 )
25
B +

25
A
As Proposition 3 shows, with retention strategies prices do not depend on market
share. For any A; B, it can be inferred that for rivals customers, the price is lower
with retention strategies, while the price for old customers, po;Ri , is higher with retention.
However, there is a portion of old customers (saved customers) who receive a discount
and pay a lower price.
Corollary 4 With A = B = , the results are RA =

25
(11+ 1) and RB =

25
(12  11).
From Corollary 4, RA is greater than 
R
B for any  >
1
2
.
While prices do not depend on market share, prot of each rm does depend on market
share and the relative switching costs (A and B). The higher is the market share and/or
the switching costs of each type of consumers, the higher is the prot of each rm. Thus,
it is important to analyse the e¤ects of market share, , and relative switching costs on
the prots and the demand of each rm.
The demand of rm A (dominant rm) with retention strategies, DRA, is given by
DRA = qAA + q
s
AA + qAB
DRA =
3
5
+
1
5
(9)
The total demand of rm A without retention strategies, DA, is
DA =
1
3
+
1
3
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With BBPD the demand of rm A does not depend in switching costs level, even
when it is consider retention strategies and when retention strategies are not allowed.
The demand of rm A after implement BBPD only depend on its baseline of consumers
from the beginning of the period, .
Without loss of generality it is consider that rm A is the dominant rm in the market,
such that  > 1
2
. The bigger rmwill always lose its dominance with and without retention
strategies. However, rm A (dominant rm) will continue with the high demand in the
market. Let us suppose that rm A departs with an initial market share of 75% of the
market,  = 0:75. BBPD with retention strategies reduce the market share to 65%,
DRA = 0:65: BBPD with no retention reduce market share to 58%, DA = 0:58: Firm A
loses dominance but still have the higher market share of the market. Because of the
retention o¤ers, rms can retain some consumers and allow rms to not lose so much
market share.
Let us look at the prots of each rm. Remember that
RA =
12
25
A +
(1  )
25
B
RB =
12(1  )
25
B +

25
A
Depending on the values of switching costs, A and B, it is important to analyse the
behaviour of prots with market share, . For that, let us take the derivative of prots
in order to :
@RA
@
=
12
25
A  
1
25
B (10)
and,
@RB
@
=
1
25
A  
12
25
B (11)
From the above equations,
 If A
B
< 1
12
, prots for rm A and rm B are decreasing in 
 If 1
12
< A
B
< 12 prot of rm A is increasing in  (while prot of rm B is
decreasing);
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 And, if A
B
> 12 both prots are increasing in .
Prots of each rm is a weighted of their market share and the switching costs of
each group of consumers: the losses in market share can be compensated by the relative
switching costs. Imagine, for example, that rm A increases its market share, , which
can be translated in a prot gain of rm A if A
B
> 1
12
. However, rm B can gain as
well. With A
B
> 1
12
this means that the switching costs of rm As customers are relative
smaller than rm Bs customers. In this case if the market share of rm B decreases this
can be compensated by the larger relative switching costs: gain in the per-unit prot with
the old customers given by the higher price than rm A. Thus, retention strategies are a
good tool for the dominant rm (rm A) to maintain its dominance in the market.
The e¤ect of an increase in  on each rms prot depends on the level of switching
costs. Over a large region of parameter values an increase in  will benet rm A and
harm rm B. However, if A is extremely high compared to B; rm B can benet from
an increase in :
Moreover, with retention strategies, the prot of rm A is higher than the prot of
rm B, i.e., A > B, i¤
A
B
>
(1  )

:
As by denition  > 1
2
as long as A > B it is always true that A > B. When B
is large enough compared to A the smaller rm can earn the higher prot. Since rm
B has more locked-in customers less customers change supplier and rm B have a higher
proportion of consumers that charge a higher price. Then, rm B can have a higher prot
even with a lower market share.
6 Pricing Strategies
As it was presented above, rms can be di¤erent pricing strategies. In some cases, de-
pending on the relative switching costs, it is better for rm pay to stayor in some cases
15
it is better pay to switch5.
In this section it is analysed the optimal pricing strategies for each rm according
with the relative switching costs of each type of consumers, A
B
. Depending on relative
switching costs, it is probably that each rm can be di¤erent incentives in their pricing
strategies: is it better to implement retention strategies or it is better to poach consumers
from the rival rm?
Firm i will choose to implement retention strategies if po;Ri   di < pr;Ri , with i = A;B;
otherwise, it is better to poach customers from rivals rm.
 If A < 14B: po;RA < pr;RA and po;RA   dA < pr;RA , rm A will o¤er a better deal
to its previous customers (passive and saved) rather than to the rivals previous
customers
 If 1
4
B < A <
1
2
B: p
o;R
A > p
r;R
A and p
o;R
A  dA < pr;RA , rm As inactive consumers
pay more than those switching from B but rm As saved consumers will pay less
 and, if A > 12B: po;RA > pr;RA and po;RA   dA > pr;RA , rm A always charges a
lower price to its rivals customers
7 Welfare Analysis
In this section it is analysed the welfare e¤ects of retention strategies with asymmetric
demand under switching costs model. Because some customers change supplier, BBPD
can lead to some ine¢ cient switching. However, the goal is compared the case when reten-
tion strategies are not allowed with the case when rms are able to implement retention
strategies and compared the results in terms of welfare.
Overall prot, R, with retention strategies is given by
R =
13
25
(A + (1  )B)
5Sha¤er and Zhang (2000).
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When rms cannot implement retention strategies, the overall prot, , is
 =
5
9
(A + (1  )B)
In this way, it can be inferred that with retention strategies the overall prot of
industry is lower when compared with the case when retention is not allowed. Average
prices decreased because rms o¤er a discount in order to retain customers and industry
prot decreases.
And, the overall prot when rms practice an uniform pricing, u, is
u =
A
9
 
22   2+ 5
When we look at the consumer surplus with retention strategies, CSR, we need to
consider the consumers of type A and the consumers of type B. The As consumer
surplus, CSRA , is given by
CSRA = v  
1
25
B  
15
25
A
And Bs consumer surplus, CSRB , is
CSRB = v  
1
25
A  
15
25
B
With retention strategies, consumer surplus, CSR, is given by
CSR = 2v   16
25
A  
16
25
B
Similarly, with no retention, consumer surplus, CS, is
CS = 2v   2
3
A  
2
3
B
Comparing the results it is inferred that consumers are better o¤with retention strate-
gies. There are a higher proportion of consumers who pay a lower price - switchers and
saved consumers. In general, consumers pay a lower price under retention strategies and
consumer surplus boosts.
The overall welfare, WR, is the sum of industry prots, R, and consumer surplus,
CSR. Then, with retention the welfare is given by
WR = 2v   16
25
A  
3
25
B +
13
25
A  
13
25
B
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Without retention strategies, the overall welfare, W , is
W = 2v   16
25
A  
19
25
B +
5
9
A  
5
9
B
It is straightford that welfare with retention strategies is higher than the welfare
without retention strategies. The decrease in industry prot is compensated by an increase
in consumer surplus and social welfare increases. Also, because less consumers make the
switching, the deadweight loss due to the decrease in ine¢ cient switching.
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